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WARRANTLESS CONTAINER SEARCHES
UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE AND SEARCH
INCIDENT EXCEPTIONS
I. Introduction
The fourth amendment limits governmental intrusion into an in-
dividual's person, his house, papers and effects and protects the
individual against "unreasonable searches and seizures"' by requir-
ing a search warrant in the event of an intrusion. Exceptions to the
warrant requirement have developed where the exigencies of the
surrounding circumstances demand immediate action.2
Warrantless searches of containers have often been sustained
under exceptions to the warrant requirement.' Prior to the Su-
preme Court decisions in United States v. Chadwick" and Arkan-
sas v. Sanders,5 warrantless searches of containers were upheld
under the automobile and the search incident to arrest exceptions. 6
In Chadwick and Sanders the Supreme Court attempted to limit
the circumstances under which containers can be searched without
a warrant. However, the restrictions outlined in Chadwick and
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
2. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that,
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or mag-
istrate, are per se unreasonable. . . subject to a few specifically established and well-deline-
ated exceptions." Id. at 454-55. See Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham,
and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 198, 199 (1977), where the author lists
more than fifteen established exceptions to the warrant requirement.
3. Automobile exception: see United States v. Halliday, 487 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1973),
rehearing denied, 488 F.2d 552 (1974) (the use of the automobile exception to validate the
search of 31 boxes found inside defendant's trailer); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990
(9th Cir. 1973) (search of a footlocker inside defendant's car sustained under the automobile
exception).
Search incident to arrest exception: see United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974) (search of attache case found in defendant's auto-
mobile upheld as incident to arrest); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (search of defendant's briefcase sustained as a proper search
incident to arrest).
4. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
5. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
6. See note 3 supra.
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Sanders have been subject to varying interpretations by lower
courts. Broad constructions of Chadwick and Sanders have vali-
dated the warrantless searches of containers under the automobile
and search incident exceptions.
This Note will first discuss the restrictions placed on warrantless
searches of containers delineated in Chadwick and Sanders. Sec-
ond, the basic areas of conflict among the lower courts involving
the warrantless search of containers justified under the automobile
and the search incident to arrest exceptions will be outlined. Fi-
nally, this Note will suggest that a strict interpretation of the
guidelines delineated in Chadwick and Sanders and an analysis of
the rationales supporting the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment lead to consistent fourth amendment protection against war-
rantless searches of most containers.
II. History of the Automobile and Search Incident to
Arrest Exceptions
A. The Automobile Exception
The automobile exception, currently utilized to justify the war-
rantless search of certain containers inside a vehicle, was first rec-
ognized in Carroll v. United States.8 In Carroll, police officers hav-
ing probable cause to believe that the defendants' vehicle
contained contraband liquor,9 searched the car without a war-
rant.10 The search resulted in the seizure of sixty-eight quarts of
bonded whiskey and gin."1 Carroll was convicted of transportation
of contraband liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act.
12
The Supreme Court validated the search of Carroll's vehicle,
pointing out that the mobile nature of an automobile requires the
7. Automobile exception: see, e.g., United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gaultney, 581
F.2d 1137 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 586 F.2d 842 (1978).
Search incident to arrest exception: see, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349 (7th
Cir. 1979); People v. De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838, cert. de-
nied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979).
8. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For a discussion of the current role of the automobile exception
in the justification of warrantless container searches, see note 158 infra and accompanying
text.
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id. at 135-36.
11. Id. at 136.
12. Id. at 134.
[Vol. IX
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application of standards different from those applied to dwellings
and structures when determining whether a search warrant is re-
quired.18 Carroll, outlining the standards to be applied to the war-
rantless search of automobiles, articulated the two requirements
needed to establish the automobile exception. First, probable cause
to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime must be
shown.1' Second, the exigency of mobility, inherent in an automo-
bile, must be present.15
Although Carroll focused on a mobile automobile as the subject
of the warrantless search, the Supreme Court in Chambers v.
Maroney"6 confronted the question whether inherent or potential
mobility will satisfy the mobility requirement of the automobile
exception. 17 In Chambers, police officers conducted a warrantless
search of the defendants' vehicle in an attempt to locate evidence
of a robbery.1 8 The search of the vehicle was conducted after the
car had been removed to a police station. 9 At the time of the
search, the vehicle was immobilized. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held that since the automobile could have been searched
when it was stopped under the automobile exception, it could also
be searched at a safer location.2 0 Courts have subsequently vali-
dated warrantless searches of vehicles conducted under the auto-
mobile exception where there is a showing of either actual or po-
tential mobility.2 1
13. Id. at 153.
14. Id. at 160-61.
15. Id. at 153. The exigency requirement for the automobile exception is implicit in Car-
roll, but more fully defined in subsequent cases. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What
Is It and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV.
987, 993 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Automobile Exception]. In Carroll, the defen-
dant's vehicle was mobile, thereby satisfying the exigency requirement. Id.
16. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
17. Id. One commentator concluded that since actual mobility was present in Carroll,
the decision must have been based on actual mobility. Note, Misstating the Exigency Rule,
28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 981, 988 (1977). It has been observed that there are logical inconsisten-
cies endemic to the automobile exception rationale. Once an automobile has been stopped
by police officers, it is no longer mobile, and a warrant should then be obtained. Comment,
The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 VILL. L. REV. 147, 167
(1974).
18. 399 U.S. at 44.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 52.
21. Actual mobility: see United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.), cert.
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,22 the Supreme Court attempted
to curtail the expanding definition of vehicle mobility. In Coolidge,
police officers arrested the defendant at his home, suspecting his
involvement in the murder of a young girl."3 The officers later re-
turned to tow the defendant's car, which was parked in his drive-
way, to the police station where it was subsequently searched2 4 In-
criminating evidence seized from the car was introduced at the
defendant's trial, which led to his conviction for murder.2
The Supreme Court held that the search of the defendant's
vehicle which led to his conviction was an unconstitutional viola-
tion of Coolidge's fourth amendment rights.2 No exigency was
found to exist which would necessitate a warrantless search.27 Dis-
cussing the circumstances which might have supported the war-
rantless search of the automobile, the Court referred to situations
involving actual mobility.28 Lower courts faced with the warrant-
denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Halliday, 487 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1973), re-
hearing denied, 488 F.2d 552 (1974).
Potential mobility: see Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1931) (although the Court in Husty does not specifically state whether the auto-
mobile was in motion at the time of arrest, it has been claimed that the circumstances did
not approach the exigency which justified the search in Carroll. Note, Mobility Reconsid-
ered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Moveable Items, 58 IOwA L. REv. 1134, 1137
(1973)); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1973). One commentator, inferring
from Chambers that the warrantless search of an automobile requires only a showing of
probable cause, eliminated entirely consideration of the mobility requirement. 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 610, 615 (1971).
22. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
23. Id. at 447.
24. Id. at 448.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 473-74.
27. The Court held that the search was not justifiable as incident to the arrest because
the search and arrest did not take place in the same vicinity, 403 U.S. at 456-57. The auto-
mobile exception was found inapplicable because the defendant had no access to his auto-
mobile at the time of arrest. Id. at 460. In response to the state's final argument, the Court
held that the search of the vehicle could not be justified under the plain view theory since it
was also inapplicable to the facts of Coolidge. Id. at 464-65.
28. The Supreme Court found that there existed, "no alerted criminal bent on flight, no
fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a chase. . . no confederates waiting to move
the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the vehicle." 403
U.S. at 462. One author noted that Coolidge should not be interpreted to require actual
mobility in all circumstances. The requirement of actual mobility in Coolidge was intended
to apply to a limited set of facts. Misstating the Exigency Rule, supra note 17, at 996. See
note 21 supra and accompanying text. In an attempt to restrict the definition of mobility
the Court stated that "the word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
19801 CONTAINER SEARCHES
less search of containers found inside vehicles prior to Chadwick
and Sanders utilized the automobile exception as a justification for
searches of both stationery and mobile vehicles."
B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
The search incident to arrest exception has been described as
the oldest exception,30 perhaps as old as the concept of arrest it-
self.3 1 The search incident exception is based on the need to pro-
tect the officer and prevent the arrestee from escaping 2 or destroy-
ing evidence.33 Attempts by courts to determine the scope of a
permissible incident search focus on three variables to be consid-
ered in judging the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest:
(1) proximity in time, (2) geographical scope and (3) intensity.84
While the rule that an incident search must be conducted
reasonably close to the time of the arrest has remained relatively
undisturbed, 5 the Supreme Court has narrowed the geographical
scope of the search incident exception." In Chimel v. California,3 7
Amendment fades away and disappears." 403 U.S. at 461.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Halliday, 487 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1973), rehearing denied,
488 F.2d 552 (1974) (search of cartons taken from mobile vehicle); United States v. Evans,
481 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1973) (search of footlocker taken from stationery automobile). Inter-
estingly, it has been noted in Coolidge that if Carroll is interpreted to permit the warrant-
less search of an unoccupied vehicle, then it would also permit the warrantless search of a
box or suitcase, 403 U.S. at 461.
30. The Automobile Exception, supra note 15, at 988.
31. Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Inci-
dent" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047, 1051 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The
Plain View Doctrine].
32. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); United States v. Campbell, 581
F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744, 746 (6th Cir. 1974). See also The
Plain View Doctrine, supra note 31, at 1053 (citing Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482, 484
(1867)).
33. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); United States v. Edwards, 602
F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145, 147 (9th Cir.
1971). See also The Plain View Doctrine, supra note 31, at 1053 (citing Reifsnyder v. Lee,
44 Iowa 101, 103 (1876)).
34. Comment, Broadening the Scope of a Search Incident to Custodial Arrest: The
Burger Court's Retreat from Chimel, 24 EMORY L.J. 151, 152 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Retreat from Chimel].
35. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819
(1969); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964).
36. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Prior to Chimel, the Supreme Court had wavered on the ques-
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defendant was arrested for the burglary of a coin shop.s5 Police
officers arrested the defendant at his home and conducted an ex-
tensive search of the entire house.89 The Supreme Court, reversing
the Ninth Circuit, suppressed the evidence seized, holding that the
search violated Chimel's fourth amendment rights. Finding the ex-
tent of the search unreasonable, the Court restricted the geograph-
ical area of an incident search to the arrestee and the area within
his immediate control.
°4 0
The permissible intensity of an incident search of a container
has been subject to varying interpretations. A number of courts,
relying on the search incident exception prior to Chadwick and
Sanders, validated warrantless searches of containers although the
possibility of physical harm or destruction of evidence was re-
mote. 1 In United States v. Kaye,42 the warrantless search of the
tion of the proper geographical scope of an incident search. In Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192 (1927), the Supreme Court first confronted the issue of the permissible scope of an
incident search. Comment, Search Incident to Arrest and The Automobile, 43 Miss. L.J.
196, 197 (1972). In Marron, agents possessing a warrant to seize contraband liquor and li-
quor manufacturing equipment discovered an incriminating ledger inside a closet on the
defendant's premises. 275 U.S. at 194. The Supreme Court upheld the seizure as incident to
the arrest of a manager of the establishment. Id. at 199. Subsequent cases in accord with
Marron include Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (seizure of papers obtained
from defendant's desk after a five-hour search of his apartment) and United States v. Rabi-
nowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (evidence taken from defendant's safe, desk and file cabinets
after search lasting longer than one hour). Harris and Rabinowitz were overruled by the
Supreme Court in Chimel. 395 U.S. at 766-68.
The Supreme Court advocated a more restrictive scope of an incident search in Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), where papers seized from the defen-
dant's desk after an extensive search of his office were declared inadmissible. Similarly, in
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), the Supreme Court invalidated the seizure
of a distillery as incident to the arrest of the distillery operator. Trupiano and Go-Bart were
overruled in Rabinowitz. See The Automobile Exception, supra note 15, at 1061-62.
37. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
38. Id. at 753.
39. Id. at 753-54.
40. Id. at 766.
41. Retreat from Chimel, supra note 34, at 167. See United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978) (search of a suitcase after it was taken
from defendant's possession upheld); United States v. Ciotti, 469 F.2d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 1151 (1974) (search of a briefcase taken from defendant
after he was handcuffed sustained); United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972)
(police search of a box found in closet six feet from defendant upheld).
It has been observed that prior decisions justified a subsequent search of a receptacle on
the premise that a container carried by the arrestee was considered within his immediate
control. W. LAFAvE, SEscH AND Smzuiw: A TREATiSE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.5 at
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arrestee's suitcase was upheld although the search took place after
the defendant had been placed in custody. Similarly, in United
States v. Eatherton,"' the defendant was frisked, handcuffed and
placed in a police car before the briefcase that he had been carry-
ing was searched."
C. The "Privacy Exception"
Where the rationale supporting an exception to the requirement of
a search warrant is found inapplicable, the exception should not
sustain the warrantless search. Analysis will then frequently focus
on the privacy interest associated with the searched property to
determine whether the search may be upheld.4'5 Difficulty in deter-
mining privacy interest associated with a particular object stems
from the failure of Sanders and Chadwick to specifically define the
objects accorded a legitimate expectation of privacy. Moreover, de-
cisions focusing on privacy are concerned primarily with the prob-
lem of standing,4' but nevertheless provide general standards for
use in privacy analysis.
In Katz v. United States,7 the Supreme Court rejected the
traditional approach to privacy which evolved from the theory of
"private places," and adopted an analysis which focuses fourth
amendment protection on people instead of places.4 8 Discussing
what would constitute a recognizable privacy interest, Justice
Harlan concurring in Katz outlined a two-pronged test: first the
defendant's actual reliance on privacy in a certain place or object,
and second, a justifiable privacy expectation according to societal
350 (1978).
42. 492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1974).
43. 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 609.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehearing, 615
F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Rivera, 486 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1980); United
States v. Morquecho, 474 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
46. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 1980) (Bazelon,
J., dissenting).
47. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court held that a wiretap placed on a
public telephone booth enabling federal agents to listen to the defendant's conversations
constituted an unreasonable search. The Court concluded that a search is more than mere
physical penetration into an area. Id. at 353.
48. 389 U.S. at 351.
9
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standards."9
Whether a privacy interest is protected by the fourth amend-
ment will also depend on the circumstances of the search."' Factors
to be considered include the precautions taken to preserve pri-
vacy,5' the manner in which the arrestee has used the searched
item,I and the applicable property rights.
III. United States v. Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders
In United States v. Chadwick,54 federal narcotics agents having
probable cause to believe that the defendants were involved in the
transportation of illegal drugs, arrested the defendants as they at-
tempted to lift a footlocker suspected of concealing contraband
into their car." The defendants were taken to the Federal Building
in Boston, where the footlocker was unlocked and searched with-
out a warrant one and one-half hours subsequent to the arrest." A
quantity of marijuana was discovered inside.'
The government advanced three arguments in support of the
search of the defendants' locked footlocker. First, the government
49. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 1980). Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
51. It has been observed in Rakas that "[bly placing personal effects inside a double-
locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain
free from public examination." Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11).
52. 439 U.S. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated that in Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant re-
tained a privacy interest in an apartment in which he slept and kept his clothing. Id.
53. The Supreme Court has stated that one who owns or possesses property retains a
legitimate expectation of privacy in that property. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12
(1978). The Court in Rakas defined a legitimate expectation of privacy as more than a sub-
jective desire to keep an area or the contents of an object private. Id. The Court, illustrating
a privacy interest which would not be accorded fourth amendment protection, stated that "a
burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season" could not challenge the
warrantless search of the cabin. Id. The burglar's expectation of privacy is not "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. See also United States v. Salvucci, 48
U.S.L.W. 4881 (June 24, 1980) (in all instances one must show a legitimate expectation of
privacy in order to have fourth amendment standing); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 48 U.S.L.W.
4885 (June 24, 1980) (requirement that defendant establish that his legitimate or reasonable
expectation of privacy was violated by the warrantless search).
54. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
55. Id. at 3-4. The arrest was effected before the engine of the car was started and while
the trunk of the vehicle remained open. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 5.
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asserted that the fourth amendment protects only interests related
to the home.58 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, point-
ing out that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places."59
Second, the government argued that although the search in
Chadwick did not fall within the ambit of the automobile excep-
tion, the rationale supporting such an exception could be applied
to the search of luggage found inside a vehicle. 0 The government
reasoned that a container inside an automobile adopts the mobile
characteristics of the vehicle and consequently should enjoy the di-
minished expectation of privacy associated with the automobile.
The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the automobile ex-
ception is based on the function of the automobile as a source of
mobility." The Court observed that once a mobile container is re-
duced to the control of law enforcement officers the mobility of the
container disappears."
The Supreme Court stated that the automobile exception is also
based on a diminished expectation of privacy inherent in the na-
ture of the automobile." The Court observed that a vehicle is ac-
corded a diminished expectation of privacy because it periodically
undergoes inspection, and normally exposes its passengers and
contents in plain view on public roads. 4 Comparing luggage to
automobiles, the Court pointed out that vehicles seldom serve as a
repository for personal items. 66 Luggage, in contrast, is entitled to
a legitimate expectation of privacy because it is intended to hold
personal items, and its contents are neither exposed to public view
nor subject to regular inspections." The restrictions the Court
placed on its holding concerning the privacy interest associated
with luggage indicated, however, that different types of containers
are entitled to varying degrees of fourth amendment protections.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 11-12. The government unsuccessfully attempted to justify the search of the
defendants' footlocker under the automobile exception in the district court. The court
pointed out that "there was no nexus between the search and the automobile, merely a
coincidence." 393 F. Supp. 763, 772 (D. Mass. 1975).
61. 433 U.S. at 12.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 12-13.
65. Id. at 12 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
66. Id. at 13.
19801
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Finally, the government claimed that a variation of the search
incident to arrest theory was applicable to the warrantless search
of the defendant's footlocker. 7 It was urged that probable cause to
believe that property in the possession of an individual is associ-
ated with a crime suffices to permit the warrantless search of that
property when the individual is arrested in public.5 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument. Recognizing the lapse of time be-
tween arrest and search, the Court stated that property seized
could not be justified as incident to an arrest if the search was
"remote in time or place from the arrest ... 69
In addition to refuting the government's third argument, the
Court formulated additional restrictions concerning the permis-
sible intensity of an incident search.70 The Supreme Court stated
that once personal property not immediately associated with the
person is reduced to the exclusive control of law enforcement of-
ficers, the rationale supporting the search incident exception dis-
appears and a warrant is then required to search the seized
property.
In Arkansas v. Sanders72 the Supreme Court attempted to ex-
tend the privacy analysis of Chadwick by clarifying the require-
ments for a warrantless search of a container. In Sanders, police
officers, acting on information supplied by an informant, stopped
the defendants who were riding in a taxi cab and removed a suit-
case from the trunk of the cars.7  The suitcase was immediately
opened, revealing a large quantity of marijuana packaged in plastic
bags.74 Sanders was convicted of possession of marijuana in viola-
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 15. See notes 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text.
70. It has been these additional restrictions which have troubled lower courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 470
F. Supp. 1212 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 615 F.2d 1351 (1979).
71. The Court stated that
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.
Id. at 15.
72. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).




tion of an Arkansas statute.7 5 On appeal, Sanders challenged the
validity of the warrantless search of the suitcase.
In an attempt to justify the search, the state relied squarely on
the automobile exception." Distinguishing Chadwick from the
facts of Sanders, the state pointed out that in Chadwick the auto-
mobile exception was inapplicable because the vehicle was only re-
motely associated with the defendants' footlocker." It was argued
that in contrast, the automobile exception applied in Sanders be-
cause both vehicle and suitcase were mobile immediately prior to
Sanders' arrest.7 8 The state asserted, moreover, that all of the req-
uisite elements of the automobile exception could be identified in
Sanders. The state contended that the officers had probable cause
to believe that the taxi was carrying contraband and that the mo-
bility of the automobile supplied the exigency required by the au-
tomobile exception. 9
In rejecting the state's argument, the Supreme Court pointed
out that the state had misunderstood the holding of Chadwick by
construing a small variation in facts as a controlling difference.80
The Court observed that the state had incorrectly inferred that the
application of the automobile exception to the warrantless search
of Sanders' vehicle would extend to the search of the defendant's
suitcase.81 The Sanders Court stated that "[a] lawful search of lug-
gage generally may be performed only pursuant to a warrant. 8 2 In
addressing the state's argument that the suitcase was mobile, the
Supreme Court observed that
a closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the
vehicle in which it rides. But ... the exigency of mobility must be assessed
at the point immediately before the search-after the police have seized the
object to be searched and have it securely within their control .... Once
police have seized a suitcase . . .the extent of its mobility is in no way
affected by the place from which it was taken.88
75. Id. at 755-56.
76. Id. at 761.
77. Id. at 762-63.
78. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
79. Id. at 19-20.
80. 442 U.S. at 757.
81. Id. at 762-63.
82. Id. at 762.
83. Id. at 763.
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The Court advised that the state would have to demonstrate a
compelling need to justify a warrantless search of a suitcase if the
search did not fall under an established exception to the warrant
requirement."'
While Sanders eliminated the automobile exception as a blanket
justification for the search of a container, language of the Supreme
Court has been construed to provide an alternative justification for
the warrantless search of containers. The Supreme Court in Sand-
ers indicated that a warrantless search of a container would be per-
mitted because of the diminished expectation of privacy associated
with a container. The Court stated that
[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of a
search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their
very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in
some cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby
obviating the need for a warrant .... There will be difficulties in determin-
ing which parcels taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search and which do not."
IV. The Automobile Exception and Privacy
In limiting the scope of a search pursuant to the automobile ex-
ception to integral parts of the automobile, 6 the Supreme Court in
84. Id.
85. Id. at 764-65 n.13. The Court added that "[olur decision in this case means only that
a warrant generally is required before personal luggage can be searched and that the extent
to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other parcels depends not at all
upon whether they are seized from an automobile." Id. Courts broadly interpreting the lan-
guage of Sanders concerning container privacy have engaged in extended analyses of the
relative privacy interest of different containers and arrived at decisions which conflict with
those of courts advocating a narrower interpretation. Compare Pirner v. State, 45 Md. App.
50, 411 A.2d 135 (1980) (warrantless search of duffel bag found invalid), with State v.
Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979) (search of unlatched knapsack sustained); United
States v. Rivera, 486 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (search of narcotics wrapped in plastic
garbage bags held unconstitutional) with Evans v. State, 368 So. 2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (no expectation of privacy in contents of plastic garbage bags).
86. Integral parts of an automobile include the glove compartment, South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364, 366 (1976); the trunk, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 437 (1973);
a concealed compartment underneath the dashboard, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44
(1970); and the area behind seat upholstery, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 136
(1925). But see Commonwealth v. Long, 48 U.S.L.W. 1183 (May 27, 1980) (locked trunk
retains greater expectation of privacy than other integral parts of the automobile).
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Sanders discussed the relative privacy interests associated with
vehicles and luggage. However, decisions of lower courts demon-
strate a lack of uniformity in determining the privacy interests sur-
rounding other objects."'
A. Cargo
Courts sustaining the search of plastic or burlap bales or similar
items avoid a privacy analysis entirely by classifying these contain-
ers as cargo.88 Defined as cargo, a container is automatically
stripped of protection against a warrantless search.8e
In United States v. Gooch,90 defendant's airplane was stopped
and searched under the automobile exception"1 by officers who had
probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in the
transportation of contraband." Marijuana was discovered in
plastic bales on the plane." The Tenth Circuit upheld the search,
concluding that the bales represented cargo and consequently re-
tained no expectation of privacy that would protect them from a
warrantless search. 4
In United States v. Zepp,'5 a cloth-covered object defined as
cargo was denied fourth amendment protection." In Zepp, a flat-
bed truck was stopped because the defendant was thought to be
transporting a stolen battery hidden beneath a black cloth on the
back of the truck. 7 Officers uncovered the stolen battery and ar-
87. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Ficklin, Nos. 77-2923 and 77-3220 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978) (mem.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 925
(1978); United States v. Zepp, 466 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Flynn v. State, 374 So. 2d
1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Evans v. State, 368 So. 2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
89. "Cargo" refers to a mass shipment of goods. See United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d at
124. The goods are normally intended for resale and not for personal use. See Evans v.
State, 368 So. 2d at 59.
90. 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. It has been determined that the automobile exception applies to airplanes as well as
automobiles. See United States v. Sigal, 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954
(1974).
92. 603 F.2d at 123.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 126.
95. 466 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
96. Id. at 1066.
97. Id. at 1063.
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rested the defendant." The search of the defendant's truck was
sustained on the grounds that the vehicle was properly stopped
under the automobile exception and the cloth-draped object was
appropriately categorized as cargo.99
B. Cartons and Boxes
Sanders has been interpreted in some instances to prohibit war-
rantless searches of containers under the automobile exception
under most circumstances except those specifically described by
the Supreme Court as permitting a warrantless search. 100 The Sec-
ond Circuit in United States v. Dien 01 applied a restrictive analy-
sis to a search of a cardboard carton, avoiding classification of the
container as cargo.102 In Dien, a police officer stopped the defen-
dant in his van and opened one of the sealed cardboard cartons
located inside the vehicle, discovering marijuana.103 The Second
Circuit invalidated the warrantless search, holding that the search
could not be justified by the automobile exception.1 0 4 The court,
applying a privacy analysis to the search of the carton, concluded
that
[b]y placing the marihuana inside a plain cardboard box, sealing it with
tape and placing it inside a van the windows of which had been painted
over and in which plywood had been placed behind the drivers' seat, peti-
tioners manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from
public examination.105
Although the container searched was a cardboard carton and not
a formal piece of luggage, the Second Circuit held that the defen-
dants retained a legitimate expectation that the contents of the
box would remain unexposed to public view. It is unclear whether
the basis of the court's decision in Dien was the additional care
98. Id. at 1064.
99. Id. at 1067. The court attempted to conform to the guidelines articulated in Sanders
by contending that the plain view doctrine was applicable to the search. The court stated
that the nature of the cargo was apparent to anyone familiar with that particular type of
battery. Id. at 1066.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehearing,
615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Mannino, 487 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
101. 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979), affd on rehearing, 615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
102. Id. at 1046.
103. Id. at 1041-42.




taken to ensure privacy or whether a closed cardboard box without
more would suffice to ensure that the contents of a container would
be protected.'" According to the Supreme Court in Sanders, where
the defendant's failure to lock his suitcase did not alter its funda-
mental character as a repository for personal effects,107 it can be
inferred that the sealing tape placed on the cardboard box did not
alter the general character of the carton.
Other courts have broadly interpreted Chadwick and Sanders in
formulating an approach to the analysis of privacy interest con-
cerning containers searched without a warrant.10 8 In United States
v. Neumann,1e" police officers, acting on a reasonable belief that
the defendants were engaged in illegal drug transactions, stopped
the defendants in their car. 10 Believing that a cardboard box in-
side the vehicle contained contraband, the officers lifted the lid
and discovered a quantity of pills."' The Eighth Circuit upheld
the search, stating that Neumann could not claim a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the cardboard box.12 The court concluded
that "there is simply an insufficient expectation of privacy in an
unsecured cardboard box sitting in plain view in the passenger
compartment of an automobile."1 8
In arriving at its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the
warrantless search in terms of the intensity of the intrusion. Ob-
serving that a simple action was required to open the box, the
court stated that "[t]he arresting officers merely lifted the lid of
106. The court in United States v. Mannino, 487 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), based its
conclusions concerning the warrantless search of several different types of containers on the
manner in which the receptacles were sealed. AMannino held, in accordance with Dien, that
the search of the defendants' sealed cartons was a violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at
514. However, the court upheld the search of a carton in which rags or newspapers were
placed over the box closed by interlocking flaps. Id. at 513. The court recognized that "the
distinction between boxes whose flaps are interlocked and those sealed with tape is indeed
narrow." Id.
107. 442 U.S. at 762-63 n.9.
108. See, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 613 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1979); United States
v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th
Cir.), rehearing denied, 586 F.2d 842 (1978); United States v. Mannino, 487 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); People v. Maldonado, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 26, 1980 at 1, col. 6.
109. 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 356-57.
111. Id. at 357.
112. Id. at 360.
113. Id.
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the box and discovered a large quantity of pills.' ' 1 4
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Gaultney"5 vali-
dated the search of a small cardboard box located in the defen-
dant's truck. Drug enforcement agents, having probable cause to
believe that the defendant's vehicle contained illegal contraband,
arrested the defendant and searched the box, discovering a
quantity of cocaine."1
Addressing Chadwick, the Gaultney court stated that while
Chadwick's double-locked footlocker retained a high expectation of
privacy, the defendant's box in Gaultney enjoyed a significantly
diminished privacy expectation." 7 In examining the privacy inter-
est associated with the defendant's box, the Fifth Circuit was influ-
enced by the observation that the defendant's "undoubted purpose
was to display the box and its contents to the agents.""6 The court
added that the defendant had disclosed to an agent information
concerning the contents of the box." 9
C. Paper Bags and Cups
Warrantless searches of paper bags and cups and other similar
containers have been sanctioned by courts which have concluded
that these items by their nature possess no protectible expectation
of privacy."20 In Clark v. State,"'2 defendant's rented car was
114. Id. at 360-61. Cf. note 106 supra and accompanying text. The court also applied the
plain view doctrine to the search of the box, indicating that the box was exposed to the
officers' view. Id. at 360. Although the box was in plain view, its contents were not, and the
plain view doctrine does not authorize the search of the contents of an object which are not
exposed to public view. See United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749, 752 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978).
115. 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978).
116. Id. at 1139.
117. Id. at 1144-45.
118. Id. at 1145.
119. Id. The court's analysis appears strained, because the defendant did not intend to
publicize information concerning the contents of the box. Information concerning the nar-
cotics was revealed to an agent because the defendant had been led to believe that the agent
was a prospective buyer. Id. at 1139.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980); Clark v.
State, 574 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1978); People v. Diaz, 101 Cal. App. 3d 440, 161 Cal. Rptr. 645
(1980); Webb v. State, 373 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). See also United States v.
Morquecho, 474 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1979), where the court confronted the search of a
plastic garbage bag. The court in Morquecho upheld the search, stating that "the plastic
garbage bag is not property similar in kind to luggage as contemplated by the decision in
Chadwick." Id. at 1140. In United States v. Mannino, 487 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the
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searched under the automobile exception by police officers who be-
lieved that the defendant was involved in illegal drug transac-
tions.12  A paper bag found inside the vehicle was opened, re-
vealing a quantity of marijuana and L.S.D. tablets. " As a result of
this evidence, defendant was convicted of possession of an illegal
drug. 124 On appeal, the defendant argued that the warrantless
search of the paper bag constituted a violation of the fourth
amendment. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
finding that the defendant had no protectible expectation of pri-
vacy in a paper bag.12
Interpreting Chadwick, the court in Clark concluded that some
containers found inside automobiles may be searched under the
automobile exception, depending on the relative privacy interest
associated with the object to be searched.1 26 Comparing the hold-
ing of Chadwick to its own decision, the Alaska Supreme Court
concluded, "the expectation of privacy inherent in locked luggage
is incomparably higher than in the container involved here, a
paper bag.1 1
The Florida District Court of Appeal in Webb v. State 28 also
observed that an individual does not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in a paper bag. In Webb, defendant's automobile was
stopped by law enforcement officers acting on the belief that the
defendant's vehicle contained illegal narcotics. 9 The officers
seized and opened a brown paper bag found inside the vehicle.13 0
search of a paper bag found inside a white plastic bag was upheld. The court observed that
the plastic bag was not sealed and therefore concluded that the defendants had no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in either bag. Id. at 514. But see United States v. Rivera, 486 F.
Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1980), where the court was faced with the search of parcels shaped
like marijuana bricks and wrapped in black plastic garbage bags. The Rivera court observed
that although the bags were not arguably as strong as cartons or duffel bags, Id. at 1032, the
precaution of choosing opaque bags and sealing the parcels demonstrated a sufficient expec-
tation of privacy to require a warrant for a search of the bags. Id.
121. 574 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1978).
122. Id. at 1262.
123. Id.




128. 373 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
129. Id. at 401.
130. Id.
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In upholding the search, the Webb court stated that the reasoning
employed by the Supreme Court in Chadwick and Sanders sup-
ported the search.'81 The Webb court distinguished the search of
the paper bag from the searches conducted in Chadwick and Sand-
ers, stating that the containers involved were associated with dif-
ferent privacy interests. 3 ' The court in Webb held that there are
"arguable differences between the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy one might attach to a paper bag as opposed to a briefcase or
luggage of some type."13 The Florida appellate court justified the
difference in privacy interest by observing that luggage is used as a
repository for personal items, while paper bags are not commonly
associated with a similar use."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in United States v. Ross' 5 was similarly faced with the
search of a "lunch-type" brown paper bag. In Ross, the search oc-
curred after the defendant was stopped in his automobile by police
officers who suspected him of involvement in the sale of illegal
drugs."' Heroin was found inside the paper bag.8 7
In evaluating the constitutionality of the search of the paper
bag, the Ross court attempted to determine the fourth amendment
protections accorded various kinds of containers. Examining war-
rantless searches of containers held invalid by other courts, the
Ross court observed a similarity among the objects searched. The
containers held to retain an expectation of privacy sufficient to
trigger fourth amendment protection include suitcases,'83 brief-
131. Id. at 403. In Webb, the appellate court upheld the defendants' conviction without
issuing a specific ruling as to the validity of the search of the paper bag. The Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held on procedural grounds that the issue of the search of the paper
bag was not properly reserved for appellate review. A ruling on this issue would not have
been dispositive, because bales of marijuana were also found in the trunk of the defendant's
car, which would have been sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction. Id. at
402-03.
132. Id. at 403.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. No. 79-1624 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980).
136. Id. at 2-3.
137. Id. at 3.
138. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Montano, 613 F.2d
147 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. MacKay, 606 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1979); State v. Crutch-
field, 123 Ariz. 570, 601 P.2d 333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Haughland v. State, 374 So. 2d 1026
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Buday v. State, 150 Ga. App. 686, 258 S.E.2d 318 (1979); State v.
202 [Vol. IX
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cases,'39 portfolios,14 0 duffel bags,14 1 gym bags,4 2 backpacks'4 3 and
handbags.'" According to the Ross court, the types of containers
not protected by the fourth amendment and thereby subject to a
warrantless search include boxes," 5  toolboxes," 6  taped razor
cases,14 7 plastic and burlap bags, 4 8 and unlatched knapsacks." 9
The Ross court identified three elements which frequently lead
courts to conclude that an object does not enjoy a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy. First, the court pointed out that paper bags
offer only minimal protection against intrusion.1 0 Second, the con-
tents of a paper bag are much more likely to become subject to
public display. 5' Finally, the court observed that paper bags are
not invariably associated with an expectation of privacy by soci-
ety." It was pointed out that a reasonable man would not identify
Gauldin, 44 N.C. App. 19, 259 S.E.2d 779 (1979).
139. See United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1979); Moran v. Morris, 478 F.
Supp. 145 (C.D. Cal. 1979); In re B.K.C., No. 13779 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 1980); Araj v. State, 592
S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
140. See United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1979).
141. See United States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979); Pirner v. State, 45 Md.
App. 50, 411 A.2d 135 (1980).
142. See State v. Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 441, 601 P.2d 975 (1979); People v. Minjares,
24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1979) (search of tote bag held invalid).
143. See United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979).
144. See United States v. Cornejo, 598 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1979) (search of defendant's
purse upheld, although the court indicated that Chadwick would not apply retroactively,
stating that "the search of the purse without a warrant may have been illegal under United
States v. Chadwick. . . ." Id. at 559); Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); People v. Pressman, N.Y.L.J. June 11, 1980 at 10, col. 1.
145. See United States v. McGrath, 613 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Neu-
mann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir.),
rehearing denied 586 F.2d 842 (1978); United States v. Mannino, 487 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
146. See Wyss v. State, 262 Ark. 502, 558 S.W.2d 141 (1977). But see People v. Dalton,
24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979).
147. See Cooper v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. App. 1979).
148. See United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ficklin,
Nos. 77-2923 and 77-3220 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978) (mei.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 925 (1978);
United States v. Morquecho, 474 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Flynn v. State, 374 So. 2d
1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
149. See State v. Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979). But see United States v. Meier,
602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979) (search of closed but unlocked backpack held invalid).
150. No. 79-1624, slip op. at 14.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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a paper bag as a repository for personal items.1" In contrast, the
Ross court noted that luggage functions as a "portable closet and
chest of drawers. 154
Judge Bazelon, dissenting in Ross, criticized the majority's reli-
ance on privacy as a new exception to the warrant requirement.15'
He argued that the use of an expectation of privacy test" defeats
the efforts of the Supreme Court to limit the scope of exceptions to
the warrant requirement to situations of absolute necessity.5 7 The
practical effect of the expectation of privacy test, according to the
dissent, is the utilization of the automobile exception to justify the
seizure of a container, and the use of the seizure to reduce the ex-
pectation of privacy surrounding the container." 8
The dissenting opinion further criticized the majority for turning
Chadwick and Sanders into a mere luggage rule.1" Under the
majority's rule, luggage cannot be searched when seized under the
automobile exception, but other containers may be subject to a
warrantless search depending on their respective privacy inter-
ests."e0 Analysis would then necessarily focus on whether the object
searched could be classified as luggage.
The majority's luggage rule raises complications in the area of
equal protection. Judge Bazelon cogently noted that distinguishing
between paper bags and luggage creates a class bias, since "in some
of our subcultures paper bags are often used to carry intimate per-
sonal belongings. "6 Judge Bazelon added that "surely the appli-
153. Id.
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id. at 3 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
156. The dissent in Ross explained that the expectation of privacy test was developed by
the Supreme Court out of necessity, in order to determine standing for those defendants
who did not own the property searched. The cases cited by the majority to support the
theory that the defendant must demonstrate a privacy interest in the object searched are all
concerned with standing and not meant to curtail the fourth amendment rights of property
owners. The expectation of privacy test is ancillary to the traditional test of ownership. No.
79-1624, slip op. at 4-5 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1-3 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 11-12 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Reliance on an expectation of privacy analysis
results in the validity of a container search turning on the fortuitous circumstances of the
container's previous location. In Sanders, the Supreme Court stated that the search of a
container must not depend on the location from which it was taken. 442 U.S. at 763-64.
159. No. 79-1624 at 7 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 7-8 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 14 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). The question was raised in the reply brief for the
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cability of the warrant requirement cannot turn on whether a
person carries his belongings in a frayed cloth suitcase or new
American Tourister. 1
2
Judge Bazelon also observed that the majority required the de-
fendant to demonstrate the entitlement of his container to fourth
amendment protection.163 The dissent pointed out that on the con-
trary, the burden must rest on those seeking an exemption from
the warrant requirement to establish the need for the warrantless
search,'" because "personal property is presumptively protected
against warrantless searches."1 5
In People v. Diaz,"' the California Court of Appeal sustained
the search of a paper cup found inside the defendant's vehicle. In
Diaz, a police officer stopped the defendant in his truck, believing
that the vehicle contained contraband narcotics. 67 Inside the truck
the officer found a paper cup with an opaque lid and protruding
straw."" Lifting the cup, the officer concluded that it contained
solid rather than liquid contents.1" The officer removed the lid of
the cup, discovering four packets of heroin. 170
The Diaz court in upholding the seizure concluded that the de-
fendant's vehicle was properly stopped under the automobile ex-
ception and the search of the paper cup was valid.1 71 In response to
the defendant's argument that a warrant was required to inspect
the contents of the cup which were not in plain view, the court
pointed out that protection against a warrantless search in Chad-
wick extended to "personal luggage intended as a repository for
petitioner in Sanders
[W]hat then constitutes 'luggage?' Would luggage be limited to 'American Tourister?'
Would it be extended to cover briefcases? Would it extend to sacks or paper bags in
which a person might keep 'personal effects?' If not, could the poor then raise an
Equal Protection claim if they did not have the money to afford 'formal luggage?'
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
162. No. 79-1624, slip op. at 13 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 3 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
164. Id. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
165. No. 79-1624 at 5 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
166. 101 Cal. App. 3d 440, 161 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1980).
167. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 443-44, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48.
168. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 444, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 446-47, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
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personal effects .. .. ,,17 The court added that implicit in the
Chadwick decision is the determination that the nature of the ob-
ject searched must support a rational expectation of privacy.17 3
The California court concluded that "a commonplace soft-drink
cup-without more-possesses none of the indicia of a repository
for personal effects to which a reasonable expectation of privacy
attaches. '17 4
Comparison of cartons, paper bags and cups to luggage to deter-
mine fourth amendment protection reduces analysis to a question
of whether a paper bag is endowed with the characteristics of a
suitcase. 7 Determining fourth amendment rights in such a man-
ner ignores not only the individual's subjective privacy interests
but also misconstrues the analysis mandated by the Supreme
Court to determine whether society will recognize as legitimate the
individual's privacy expectation in a particular container.
V. Search Incident to Arrest: The Concepts of Control
and Association with the Person
A. Control of a Container
Courts faced with an incident search of a container most fre-
quently do not address the question whether there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the object being searched. 1 7 Instead, con-
flicts have arisen from attempts to interpret the meaning of control
of a container searched incident to an arrest. Courts strictly adher-
ing to the rule of Chadwick and Sanders have invalidated the
search of containers once they come within the physical possession
of a police officer.17 7 Other courts have validated the search of re-
ceptacles within the possession of an officer, relying on a broad in-
172. Id. at 447, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 649. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
173. Id. at 447, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
174. Id. at 448, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
175. The Supreme Court in Sanders specifically stated that its decision was confined to
the search of luggage. 442 U.S. at 765 n.13.
176. The rationale of the search incident to arrest does not require discrimination be-
tween objects searched on the basis of privacy expectation. Incident searches of objects on
the arrestee's person or within his control are conducted to protect the arresting officer and
prevent the destruction of evidence. See notes 31 and 32 supra and accompanying text.
177. See United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978); Ulesky v. State, 379 So.
2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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terpretation of control. 1' 8
In People v. De Santis, '7  an airlines ticket agent opened the
defendant's suitcase and discovered a quantity of marijuana in-
side.180 Local police arrested the defendant in the airlines terminal
and took him to a police substation, where his suitcase was
opened.'
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search as incident to
De Santis' arrest.18 2 Discussing the applicability of Chadwick, the
De Santis court distinguished the search of De Santis' suitcase on
two factual grounds. First, the court pointed out that the search in
De Santis was not significantly divorced in time or place from the
arrest while in Chadwick, the search of the defendants' footlocker
took place more than one hour after the arrest.'
Second, the De Santis court discussed the difference between
the containers searched.18 4 The court observed that in Chadwick, a
bulky, double-locked footlocker was the subject of the warrantless
search while in De Santis, a small, portable suitcase was the focus
of the search by police officers. Applying the rationale supporting
the search incident exception, the court observed that the double-
locked footlocker could be neither rapidly removed from the con-
trol of police officers nor quickly opened to obtain weapons in con-
trast to De Santis' suitcase.'18 The De Santis court concluded that
178. See United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979); People v. De Santis, 46
N.Y.2d 82, 88, 385 N.E.2d 577, 579-80, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S.
912 (1979). See also United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 470 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
615 F.2d 1351 (2d Cir. 1979), where the defendant's briefcase was searched incident to his
arrest after he had placed it on the floor. The court concluded that the briefcase was still
within the defendant's control, stating that the arresting officers "were not required under
such circumstances to attempt to separate the luggage from the defendant with any and all
risks that might be attendant thereon." Id. at 1223.
179. 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912
(1979).
180. Id. at 86, 385 N.E.2d at 578, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 839-40.
181. Id. at 86, 385 N.E.2d at 579, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
182. Id. at 89, 385 N.E.2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
183. Id. at 89, 385 N.E.2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 841. The De Santis court attempted to
distinguish Chadwick on the basis that the search of a footlocker could not be classified as
an incident search. The court nonetheless acknowledged the applicability of Chadwick by
concluding that De Santis' suitcase was not within the exclusive control of police officers
when searched. 46 N.Y.2d at 88, 385 N.E.2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
184. Id. at 89, 385 N.E.2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at.841.
185. Id. at 89, 385 N.E.2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42. Sanders, decided subsequent
to De Santis, indicates that the distinctions drawn by the De Santis court are not disposi-
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police officers had not gained exclusive control of De Santis' suit-
case. 186 Refraining from defining the concept of exclusive control,
the De Santis court merely stated "the suitcase was opened, not
after the police had gained exclusive control of it, not away from
the securely incarcerated defendant as in Chadwick, but rather
directly upon defendant's arrest in a private airport room with no
danger to the public and in the presence of defendant ... .
Dissenting in De Santis, Judge Wachtler pointed out that there
was no reason to search the defendant's luggage for dangerous
weapons. The officers had been informed by the ticket agent of the
contents of the defendant's suitcase. Consequently, the officers had
no reason to fear that weapons or explosives would be inside the
container. 188
In United States v. Garcia,'89 the Seventh Circuit similarly vali-
dated the search of a suitcase conducted incident to the defen-
dant's arrest. The defendant had been arrested in an airlines ter-
minal while in the possession of two suitcases. 90 Informed that she
was under arrest, the defendant dropped both suitcases."91 An of-
ficer picked up the luggage and escorted the defendant to a nearby
area free of pedestrian traffic."e2 The suitcases were placed within
the defendant's reach and subsequently opened by police of-
ficers. 98 One of the suitcases contained heroin."94 Defendant was
convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois for possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tive. As in De Santis, the search of Sanders' suitcase was conducted in close proximity to
the defendant's arrest. In addition, the containers searched in Sanders and De Santis were
similar. Finally, the defendant in Sanders was present at the time of the search, as was the
defendant in De Santis. The Supreme Court in Sanders stated that the suitcase was not
within Sanders' immediate control, indicating that the application of the search incident
exception would have been inappropriate. 442 U.S. at 763-64 n.11.
186. Id. at 89, 385 N.E.2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979).
190. Id. at 352. Information supplied by an informant provided the requisite probable
cause for the arrest. The informant provided narcotics agents with an account of the defen-
dant's activities involving the transportation of heroin. Id. at 351.






tribute.'" 5 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of the
search, following the reasoning utilized in De Santis.
Ignoring Sanders, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Chadwick
on two factual grounds, arguing that first, the difference in proxim-
ity of the search and second, the difference between the containers
searched justified the result.1" In an attempt to bolster the valid-
ity of the search and demonstrate compliance with the search inci-
dent rationale,97 the court stated that the suitcases were "two
hand-carried, portable suitcases which were quite capable of being
opened quickly by the defendant in order to gain access to a
weapon or evidence. .... 9$198
In upholding the search of the defendant's luggage, the Garcia
court emphasized a broad interpretation of the concept of exclu-
sive control. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendant's
suitcases, although in the possession of a police officer, were not
within the officer's exclusive control.'" Discussing exclusive con-
trol, the court stated "to construe the term 'exclusive control' as
meaning it attaches immediately upon the seizure of an object lo-
cated on the .person or within the immediate vicinity of the
arrestee, is a construction incapable of application consistent with
fundamental principles of constitutional law."200
The Garcia court found that once obtained, exclusive control
still may not suffice to protect a container from a warrantless
incident search. The Seventh Circuit, noting the language used by
the Supreme Court in Chadwick, observed that even though a
container may be within the exclusive control of an officer, this
does not preclude the possibility that there may still exist a danger
that the arrestee will seize a weapon or destroy evidence.2 01 The
195. Id. at 350.
196. Id. at 353.
197. See generally notes 32 and 33 supra and accompanying text.
198. 605 F.2d at 354.
199. Id. at 355-56. The government argued that "the luggage was reduced to the exclu-
sive control of the agents after they left the scene of the arrest with the luggage and the
defendant." 605 F.2d at 356 n.9.
200. 605 F.2d at 355. The Seventh Circuit, confusing incident searches of items immedi-
ately associated with the person with the search in Garcia, reasoned that under such a con-
struction the warrantless search of items, such as wallets and purses, would be forbidden.
Id.
201. Id. at 354. Examining closely the language of Chadwick, the Seventh Circuit stated
once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
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broad construction of the search incident exception advocated by
the Seventh Circuit raises the issue of whether a search warrant
would ever be required for an incident search. 2°0
On the issue of control of a container, the factual distinctions
drawn between Sanders and Garcia do not support the differing
results. First, the fact that the suitcase in Sanders was taken from
the trunk of an automobile, while the bags in Garcia had been
within the defendant's grasp prior to the search is not relevant to
the question of control. 03 Second, the difference of a few feet sepa-
rating container and arrestee should be insignificant for fourth
amendment purposes.
Analysis of proximity introduces the additional problem that po-
lice officers would create the exigency necessary for a warrantless
search.20 4 In Garcia, the defendant alleged that the arresting of-
ficers created the exigency permitting a warrantless search of her
luggage by placing her bags within her reach. 05 In response to this
contention, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the search was
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.
605 F.2d at 354 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15). The Garcia court's
emphasis on the word 'and' indicates that more than exclusive control is required for a
search warrant to attach to the search of a container.
202. Courts interpreting Chadwick literally may find that police officers acquire exclu-
sive control over an object only after the defendant is safely separated from the container
previously in his possession. The Garcia court acknowledged the government's argument
that exclusive control was obtained after the arresting officers left the terminal building
with the defendant and her luggage. 605 F.2d at 356 n.9. However, courts advocating the
finding of exclusive control at a point later in time than the arrest and search may in effect
be authorizing warrantless searches of containers in nearly all instances. This view argues
that exclusive control cannot be obtained during the period incident to the arrest. This
approach stands in sharp contradiction to the statement in Chadwick that once exclusive
control of an object is obtained, the search of that object is no longer incident to an arrest.
203. See note 158 supra and acccompanying text.
204. In Hardwick v. State, 149 Ga. App. 291, 254 S.E.2d 384 (1979), police officers waited
until the defendant drove away in his car before arresting him, although probable cause to
arrest existed before defendant entered his car. Id. at 293, 254 S.E.2d at 386. After defen-
dant was arrested, a warrantless search of the car was conducted, revealing a quantity of
marijuana. Id. at 292, 254 S.E.2d at 385. The court, invalidating the search, observed that
"the state may not take advantage of exigent circumstances which the state permitted to
occur and thereby be excused from the requirement of securing a warrant." Id. at 293, 254
S.E.2d at 386. See also State v. Kelgard, 40 Or. App. 205, 594 P.2d 1271 (1979).
205. 605 F.2d at 356.
CONTAINER SEARCHES
completed within fifteen seconds of the arrest and that the luggage
was only momentarily separated from the defendant.20 6 Despite
the temporary separation of the defendant from her luggage, the
court concluded that the luggage remained continuously within
Garcia's reach,0 7 even at the point immediately prior to the
search.
B. Containers and Immediate Association with the
Person
The Supreme Court in Chadwick expressly excepted objects im-
mediately associated with the person from the requirements for a
warrantless search. 08 Objects immediately associated with the per-
son of the arrestee may be searched even when in the exclusive
control of a police officer. Different treatment of objects immedi-
ately associated is based on the theory that the additional intru-
sion is minimal, involving no greater reduction in the individual's
privacy expectations where the individual has been arrested.2 0 9
Supreme Court decisions upholding warrantless searches of ob-
jects immediately associated with the arrestee have focused on the
objects taken from the person of the arrestee.20 The Supreme
Court's failure to define 'immediate association with the person'
has led to confusion in the lower courts concerning the status of
certain containers. Handbags represent one source of conflict.
Application of the restrictive language of Chadwick may result
in the classification of handbags with luggage. In People v. Press-
man, 2111 defendant and a female companion were arrested for pos-
session of a marijuana cigarette.2 12 The arresting officers directed
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 433 U.S. at 15. See also note 71 supra and accompanying text.
209. See United States v. Berry, 560 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 2
(1978); W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEizuRES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS, § 12.3 at 12-14 (2d ed.
1979).
210. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search of defendant's clothing);
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (search of cigarette package taken from defen-
dant's coat pocket); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search of cigarette box
found in defendant's pocket). One commentator has observed that searches of items such as
clothing and cigarette packages removed from the arrestee's pockets should be categorized
as "searches of the person". Case Note, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 421, 434 (1977-78).
211. N.Y.L.J. June 11, 1980 at 10, col. 1.
212. Id.
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the defendant and his companion to empty the bags which they
had been carrying.1  Cocaine discovered in defendant's bag21  was
suppressed at trial by the New York Supreme Court. The Press-
man court, recognizing the different treatment accorded items im-
mediately associated with the person, rejected an immediate asso-
ciation analysis and determined that once the defendants were
placed under arrest and had relinquished their bags, the bags were
no longer within their immediate control.21 '5 Noting that the war-
rantless search of such receptacles as purses, tote bags, knapsacks
and satchels had been invalidated on privacy grounds," the Press-
man court had little difficulty concluding that the defendants' bags
were entitled to fourth amendment protection. The court stated
that the constitutionality of a search should not depend on the
fabric or shape of the receptacle but rather on the legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy which the container enjoys. 211
Similarly, the search of a handbag in Ulesky v. State"' was held
invalid by the Florida District Court of Appeal. In Ulesky, defen-
dant was stopped in a pickup truck by a police officer who subse-
quently discovered marijuana in the truck.2 9 After the defendant
was arrested and placed in the officer's patrol car, the officer
searched the defendant's purse which was located inside the
truck.2 10 The search revealed several bags of marijuana.2 21
The Florida District Court of Appeal held that the purse was not
within the defendant's immediate control when seized.2 22 Applying
the rationale supporting the search incident exception, the court
concluded that there was no longer a danger that the defendant
would obtain weapons or evidence from her purse at the time of
the search.2 8
In contrast to the holdings of Pressman and Ulesky, the Mary-
213. Id.
214. Id.
215, Id. at 10, col. 2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).








land Court of Special Appeals in Dawson v. Maryland224 held that
the search of a defendant's purse was a valid search incident to her
arrest. In Dawson, a police officer found the defendant at the scene
of a shooting incident and arrested her after being informed that
she was carrying a gun in her purse.2 25 The officer searched the
defendant's purse incident to her arrest.226 Validating the search,
the Maryland court distinguished Chadwick by stating that a
handbag is "'immediately associated with the person of the arres-
tee' because it is carried with the person at all times ... 22
Instances may arise where the defendant's handbag is not lo-
cated on her arm but within her immediate control at the time of
arrest. The definition of 'immediate association' may then have to
be extended to articles located beyond the person, in which case
the expression loses its identity as a separate classification. Con-
versely, if a handbag cannot be searched when located within the
defendant's reach but not touching her person, the validity of the
search will then depend on the location of the object instead of the
legitimate expectation of privacy it enjoys.228
The classification of handbags among items immediately associ-
ated with the person raises questions of equal protection. While
certain containers carried by women are defined as handbags,
items put to similar use by men described as shoulder bags or
briefcases, are more closely related to luggage, and thereby ac-
corded fourth amendment protections. The difficulty courts experi-
ence in evaluating the search of items, such as handbags, that are
immediately associated with the person was noted by the dissent-
ers in Chadwick who stated that the "Court's opinion does not ex-
plain why a wallet carried in the arrested person's clothing, but not
the footlocker in the present case is subject to 'reduced expecta-
224. 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
225. Id. at 647-48, 395 A.2d at 164.
226. Id. at 648-49, 395 A.2d at 164-65.
227. Id. at 651-52, 395 A.2d at 166 (quoting United States v. Berry, 560 F.2d 861, 864
(7th Cir. 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 2 (1978)).
228. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
The conclusion that a handbag is immediately associated with the person because it is
carried by that person at all times is based on the notion that the handbag has become
closely identified with the person in a manner similar to clothes worn by the person or
objects carried in clothing pockets. While there may be some similarity between items tradi-
tionally associated with the person and handbags, a thin line separates items classified as
handbags and those classified as luggage.
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
tions of privacy caused by the arrest.' ",229
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Chadwick and Sanders placed new
restrictions on warrantless searches of containers and adopted spe-
cific guidelines for the determination of exemptions from these re-
strictions. In Sanders, the Supreme Court stated that the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy inherent in the automobile would not
extend to containers inside the vehicle, thereby eliminating the
automobile exception as a justification for a warrantless container
search. Chadwick curtailed the use of the search incident exception
as a justification for a warrantless container search. Chadwick indi-
cates that the determination of exclusive control of a container by
an enforcement officer must be evaluated according to the ratio-
nale of the incident search, the realistic possibility that an arrestee
could obtain weapons or evidence from the container once it is
within the officer's possession.'
While neither Chadwick nor Sanders defined the class of objects
immediately associated with the arrestee, the intent of the
Supreme Court to restrict warrantless searches3 0 indicates that
containers such as handbags should be treated no differently than
luggage, which is accorded strong fourth amendment protection.
Reducing an arrestee's privacy expectations to objects located be-
yond the person defies the meaning of "immediate association"
and cannot be reconciled with the retention of privacy by other
containers possessing a similar expectation of privacy. The
Supreme Court's decisions in Chadwick and Sanders indicate that
containers are to be accorded fourth amendment protection in all
possible circumstances. Application of a presumptive warrant
requirement to the search of a container and the allowance of
exemptions which conform strictly to the guidelines of Chadwick
and Sanders would result in more consistent fourth amendment
protection of containers in the possession of an arrestee.
Jody Cosgrove
229. 433 U.S. at 20-21.
230. See notes 58-69, 76-84 supra and accompanying text.
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